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Abstract How ought you to evaluate your options if you’re uncertain about which
axiology is true? One prominent response is Expected Moral Value Maximisation
(EMVM), the view that under axiological uncertainty, an option is better than
another if and only if it has the greater expected moral value across axiologies.
EMVM raises two fundamental questions. First, there’s a question about what it
should even mean. In particular, it presupposes that we can compare moral value
across axiologies. So to even understand EMVM, we need to explain what it is for
such comparisons to hold. Second, assuming that we understand it, there’s a
question about whether EMVM is true. Since there are many plausible rivals, we
need an argument to defend it. In this paper, I’ll introduce a representation theorem
for axiological uncertainty to answer these two questions. Roughly, the theorem
shows that if all our axiologies satisfy the von Neumann–Morgenstern axioms, and
if the facts about which options are better than which in light of your uncertainty
also satisfy these axioms as well as a Pareto condition, then these facts have a
relevantly unique expected utility representation. If I’m right, this theorem at once
affords us a compelling way to understand EMVM—and specifically intertheoretic
comparisons—and a systematic argument for its truth.
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Representation theorems  Decision theory
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1 Introduction
How ought you to evaluate your options if you’re uncertain about which axiology is
true? For instance, suppose you can either benefit a person or provide a larger
benefit to an animal. You’re uncertain between a speciesist and a non-speciesist
axiology. On the former it’s better to benefit the person, on the latter it’s better to
benefit the animal. Which option is better in light of your uncertainty?
One prominent view is that under axiological uncertainty an option is better than
another if and only if it has the greater expected moral value—where the expected
moral value of an option is a weighted sum of the values it’s assigned by the
axiologies, with weights representing the probabilities of these axiologies (see
Lockhart 2000; Sepielli 2010; MacAskill 2014; Tarsney 2017; MacAskill and Ord
2018). Call this view Expected Moral Value Maximisation, or EMVM. EMVM
extends the standard theory of decision-making under non-normative uncertainty to
uncertainty about axiologies. So it’s a promising view.
But it also raises questions. For one thing, there’s a question about what EMVM
should even mean—or what it would even be for an option to have a higher
expected moral value than another. Most importantly, whether an option has a
higher expected moral value than another depends on (cardinal) intertheoretic value
comparisons—facts like
(A) the value difference between outcomes x and y, according to axiology Ti, is n
times as great as the value difference between outcomes z and t, according to
axiology Tj.
So to understand EMVM, we need to know what it would even be for such a
comparison across axiologies to hold. But many people are sceptical that these
comparisons are even meaningful. Edward Gracely says that intertheoretic
comparisons are ‘essentially meaningless’ (1996, 330). James Hudson holds that
there’s generally no ‘common measure’ between different axiologies and that they
therefore ‘must be incomparable’ (1989, 224; emphasis added). John Broome
similarly contends that for most axiologies ‘we cannot take a sensible average’
between their different units of value (2012, 185). And many others are similarly
skeptic (see e.g. Gustafsson and Torpman 2014; Nissan-Rozen 2015; Hedden 2016).
Moreover, whether an option has a higher expected moral value than another not
only depends on facts like (A). It also depends on (cardinal) intratheoretic
comparisons, as well as (quantitative) axiological probabilities—i.e., facts like
(B) according to axiology Ti, the value difference between outcomes x and y is
n times as great as the value difference between outcomes z and t; and
(C) the probability of axiology Ti is pi (for some pi in [0, 1]).
So we also need to know what it is for such facts to hold. And they too are hardly
self-explanatory.
For another thing, even assuming that we understand what EMVM says, there’s a
question about whether it is true. In particular, even if we know what it would be for
intertheoretic comparisons to hold, there’s a question about whether they indeed
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hold. Perhaps they don’t. So perhaps under axiological uncertainty, you simply
ought to evaluate your options in accordance with the axiology that has the highest
probability, as the ‘My Favourite Theory’-approach suggests (see Gracely 1996;
Gustafsson and Torpman 2014). Or perhaps intertheoretic comparisons hold, but
you ought to adopt some less formal meta-deontological or meta-virtue-ethical
principles under uncertainty (see Guerrero 2007). Or perhaps you ought to be risk
averse about moral value. There are plenty of reasonable alternative views. So if we
want to endorse EMVM, we need an argument to deny them—and if possible, a
systematic argument that goes beyond brute intuitions about single cases.
In this paper, I shall adopt a strategy from standard decision theory to answer
these two worries about EMVM. I shall introduce a representation theorem for
axiological uncertainty. In a nutshell, this theorem says that if all our axiologies
satisfy the von Neumann–Morgenstern axioms, and if the facts about which options
are better than which in light of your uncertainty also satisfy these axioms as well as
a Pareto condition with respect to our axiologies, then these facts have an expected
utility representation in terms of relevantly unique probability and utility
functions—i.e., in terms of a unique probability function and a utility function
that’s unique up to transformations on which the inter- and intratheoretic ratios of
utility-differences remain constant. As I shall argue, this result affords us a
compelling explication of what EMVM would even mean. In light of this theorem,
we can understand facts about intertheoretic comparisons, top-down, in terms of
facts about which options are better than which in light of your uncertainty. For
axiologies to compare in a certain way would just be for some such facts to hold
(see Ross 2006, 763 for a brief mention of this idea). And something equivalent is
true for intratheoretic comparisons and axiological probabilities. Moreover, once we
explicate comparisons and probabilities in this manner, the theorem provides a
systematic argument to the effect that EMVM is true. If the facts about which
options are better than which in light of your uncertainty do indeed satisfy these
conditions, then EMVM simply follows. Every other view—My Favourite Theory,
or less formal meta-deontological principles, or forms of risk aversion—must be
false. So the axiomatic approach can compellingly ground EMVM. Or so I shall
argue.
In the next section, I’ll elaborate on what a representation theorem can look like
in our context, and clarify my main aim. In Sect. 3 I’ll show that axiological
uncertainty presents a relatively intricate problem for formal decision theory, and
outline the formal framework we can devise to address it. Since the proper formal
theorem will be correspondingly complex, and an elaboration of its technical details
would only distract from its philosophical import, I shall state and prove the proper
theorem only in an ‘‘Appendix’’. So in Sect. 4 I shall present the core theorem in a
simplified manner, and state the argument for EMVM that this theorem grounds. In
Sects. 5 and 6 I shall then address two worries about this argument: a worry about
the conditions of our theorem, and about the top-down explication of intertheoretic
comparisons. These worries will indicate ways in which my specific argument could
be extended. But if I’m right, they don’t subvert the relevance of the axiomatic
approach for grounding EMVM.
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2 The question and the core idea
Let me add some clarifications before I turn to the theorem. First, a piece of
terminology. My question is about when an option is better than another under
axiological uncertainty. In one, axiologically objective sense of ‘betterness’, this
just depends on the true axiology: an option is better than another if and only if it’s
better according to the axiology that’s true. But that’s not the sense of ‘betterness’
that I’m interested in. So I shall assume that there’s another, subjective sense of
‘betterness’, on which whether an option is better than another depends on the
probabilities of our axiologies (as well as the probabilities of different outcomes, if
you’re non-normatively uncertain too). I shall call this meta-value, or m-value. So
EMVM is a claim about m-value. It says that one option is m-better than another if
and only if it has the greater expected moral value relative to the probabilities of
our axiologies (and perhaps the probabilities of different outcomes). I shall give a
formal definition of this idea in Sect. 4, once I’ve introduced my formal
framework.
M-value and EMVM could still be understood more, or less, subjectively. On a
thoroughly subjective interpretation of m-value, an option is m-better than another if
it’s better in light of your credences and the intertheoretic comparisons you make.
On this interpretation, EMVM could be understood as a rational coherence
constraint on your m-value judgments—your judgments about which options are
m-better than which. It says that however precisely you’re axiologically uncertain,
you must assign certain probabilities to your axiologies, compare them in a certain
way, and evaluate options in terms of their expectation relative to your credences
and comparisons. If you do, your m-value judgments are correct. This would be
analogous to a ‘Humean’ version of decision theory—which I guess is, or has long
been, the standard one—on which your preferences are rational if and only if they
satisfy the axioms in one way or another. On a more objective interpretation of
m-value, an option is m-better than another if it’s better in light of the credences that
your evidence warrants, and the intertheoretic comparisons that are correct. On this
interpretation, EMVM figures as a more substantial theory of m-value. It says that
axiologies have certain evidential probabilities and compare in a certain way, and
that an option is m-better than another if and only if it has the greater expected
moral value relative to these probabilities and comparisons. So even if you evaluate
options in terms of their expectation relative to your credences and comparisons,
your m-value judgments might be false. This would be analogous to an objectivist
version of decision theory on which your preferences can be unreasonable even if
they satisfy the axioms, by embodying unwarranted credences or unreasonable
values.
Both of these interpretations are worth exploring. Both could be grounded, in
slightly different ways, in the theorem I’ll present. But at least in our context, I take
the objective interpretation to be more interesting. When we reflect on what’s (m-
)best in the face of arguments for competing axiologies, we try to make judgments
that are sensitive to our evidence and the correct comparisons, rather than to the
credences and comparisons we happen to find ourselves with. We’re rarely aiming
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at a thoroughly subjective sense of ‘betterness’. So in what follows, I shall
understand m-value as being relative to the credences that your evidence warrants,
and the intertheoretic comparisons that are correct.
This already indicates how I’ll understand my theorem and argument. But let me
make it more explicit. In decision theory, representation theorems were devised for
your preferences. They show that if your preferences satisfy certain axioms, they
have an expected utility representation in terms of relevantly unique probability and
utility functions. These theorems are purely formal results, implying the existence of
certain functions. But they become philosophically significant if additional
assumptions are added. On the standard Humean version, two such assumptions
are made. The first assumption is a conceptual one: that if your preferences have an
expected utility representation in terms of relevantly unique probability and utility
functions, these mathematical functions can be taken to quantitatively represent
your credences and values—i.e., you can be interpreted as maximising the
expectation of your values relative to your credences, and not just some
mathematical measure. The second assumption is a normative one: that your
preferences are normatively appropriate in some relevant sense only if (or indeed if
and only if) they satisfy these axioms. Together with these two assumptions, the
formal theorems imply that your preferences are normatively appropriate only if (or
if and only if) you maximise the expectation of your values, relative to your
credences. And this is a philosophically significant claim.
My aim is to devise a similar argument for EMVM in the context of axiological
uncertainty. But instead of preferences, our theorem will concern the facts about
which options are m-better than which, relative to the credences that your evidence
warrants and the intertheoretic comparisons that are correct. I’ll call these your
m-value facts—speaking of ‘your’ facts to indicate that they’re relative to your
evidence. So as I understand it, in our context, a pertinent representation theorem
shows that if your m-value facts satisfy certain axioms, they have an expected utility
representation in terms of relevantly unique probability and utility functions. I shall
provide such a theorem, and add two similar assumptions. I shall add the conceptual
assumption that if these facts have such an expected utility representation, the
relevant functions can be taken to represent the credences that your evidence
warrants and the actual value functions of our axiologies. And I shall add the
normative or meta-axiological assumption that your m-value facts do indeed satisfy
these axioms. If these two assumptions hold, the theorem implies that EMVM is
true.1
1 Note that on one picture of how axiologies are individuated, your making the ‘correct’ comparisons is
entailed by your having the right credences. On this picture, an axiology isn’t just a betterness-ordering.
Instead, corresponding to every ordering, there are infinitely many axiologies, which differ in having a
more or less inflated value function (see e.g. Ross 2006, 765; Sepielli 2010, 181ff.). On this picture,
there’s no single correct comparison between a standard and a speciesist axiological ordering, say.
Different versions of these orderings compare in different ways. And for you to make the ‘correct’
comparison between them is just for you to have credence in the right versions of them. My theorem and
argument are compatible with this picture. But I shall continue to speak of reasonable credences and
correct comparisons separately.
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3 The problems and the framework
Let me now introduce the formal framework for our theorem. The theorem will rely
on so-called state-dependent utility theory. This is a formal framework from
standard decision theory, in which the utility of an outcome can depend on the ‘state
of nature’ in which it comes about (see e.g. Karni 2009). It captures the structure of
axiological uncertainty very nicely, for in our problem too the ‘utility’ or value of an
outcome depends on the true ‘state’ or axiology. The details of this background
needn’t concern us now (see Karni and Schmeidler’s Theorem in the ‘‘Appendix’’).
But it’s worth indicating why axiological uncertainty presents a particularly vexing
problem for decision theory, and how it can be resolved. So let me outline at least
the core aspects of our framework.
What information must we acquire to get an expected moral value interpretation
of your m-value facts, and how can we acquire it? First of all, we need to know what
our axiologies are—or more precisely, what cardinal intratheoretic comparisons
they imply. We can do so in the standard manner of von Neumann and Morgenstern
(1944) decision theory. So I shall assume that there’s a nonempty finite set X ¼
fx; y; . . .zg of outcomes and a set O of prospects over these outcomes. Intuitively, an
outcome in X may be that an animal suffers, or that a person suffers, or whatever
non-normative state of affairs. A prospect in O may be, say, that with probability 1/2
respectively either an animal or a person will suffer. Formally, these prospects can
be represented as the set of probability distributions on X—i.e.,
O ¼ fa : X ! Rþ j
P
x2X aðxÞ ¼ 1g, for Rþ being the nonnegative reals. An
axiology Ti is a set of facts of the form ‘a is at least as good as b’, represented
by a reflexive binary relation i on O. Assuming that all our i satisfy the von
Neumann–Morgenstern axioms, we’ll be able to represent each of them (at least
considered on their own) by a relevantly unique utility function—and thus to say
what facts like (B) they imply.
However, the set O isn’t complex enough to deliver an expected moral value
interpretation of your m-value facts. Suppose that your m-value facts took the form
‘a is at least as m-good as b’, or constituted a binary relation on O. Such a relation
alone could never uniquely determine the weights that our axiological orderings
receive in your m-value facts. To see what I mean, consider three axiological
orderings. According to T1, human welfare is twice as valuable as animal welfare—
in the sense that a prospect that leads to some amount of human welfare is equally as
good as a prospect that leads to twice as much animal welfare. According to T2, only
human welfare has value, and according to T3, only animal welfare has value. Now
suppose that in your m-value relation on O, human welfare receives twice as much
moral weight as animal welfare—in the sense that a prospect leading to some
amount of human welfare is equally as m-good as a prospect leading to twice as
much animal welfare. This might be because the ordering T1 is given all the weight
in your m-value facts—i.e., because a prospect is m-better than another if and only
if it’s better according to T1. Or it might be because some weight is given to T2 and
the rest to T3 (intuitively, 2/3 and 1/3 respectively, relative to a given unit of
welfare). Or it might be because all three orderings are given some weight. If we
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want to get an expected moral value interpretation of your m-value facts, we need to
be able to distinguish these cases. We need to uniquely determine the weights that
are given to each of our axiologies.
We can do so if we introduce a more complex set of prospects, K, in which the
probability distribution over outcomes can depend on the axiology. Intuitively, a
prospect in K may be, say, that an animal will suffer if and only if T1 is true, or that
a person will suffer if and only if T2 is true and an animal if and only if T3 is true.
Formally, these prospects can be represented as the set of theory-dependent
probability distributions on X—i.e., assuming that the set of our axiologies is
nonempty and finite and that I denotes its index-set I ¼ f1; 2; . . .ng,
K ¼ fa : I  X ! Rþ j
P
x2X aði; xÞ ¼ 1 8i 2 Ig. So I shall assume that there
are m-value facts of the form ‘a is at least as m-good as b (in light of your
evidence)’, represented by a reflexive binary relation m on K. And again, I’ll
speak of ‘your m’ because this relation is relative to your evidence.
This will solve the just-mentioned problem. To see this, suppose that in your m-
value relation on K, human welfare receives twice as much moral weight as animal
welfare, in the above-mentioned sense. If in this relation, the value of animal
welfare conditional on the truth of T3 still receives weight, then the ordering T3
itself must be given at least some weight in your m-value facts. For example, if a
prospect on which an animal will suffer if and only if T3 is true and nothing happens
otherwise is m-worse than a prospect on which nothing happens, this means that T3
is given some weight. In this manner we can separate our theories from each other
by considering the richer prospects in K. Indeed, assuming that your m on K
satisfies the von Neumann–Morgenstern axioms, we’ll be able to specify a unique
weight that’s given to every axiological ordering.2
However, this is still not enough for our purposes. We don’t merely need to know
what ‘weight’ some axiological ordering is receiving in your m-value facts. We
need to know whether it has that weight because it has a high probability, or because
it has an inflated value function. And the prospects in K aren’t complex enough to
determine that. To see this, consider again our three orderings from above, and
suppose that in your m-value relation on K, T1 receives no weight at all, and T2
receives twice as much weight as T3—in the sense that a prospect that leads to some
amount of human welfare if and only if T2 is true is equally as m-good as a prospect
that leads to twice as much animal welfare if and only if T3 is true. This might be
because in light of your evidence axiology T2 has a probability of 2/3, and T3 a
probability of 1/3, and these theories are such that a given amount of human welfare
has the same value, according to T2, as the same amount of animal welfare,
according to T3. Or it might be because both theories have a probability of 1/2, but
2 One may worry that the prospects inK are unnatural. We never actually face a prospect on which, say,
an animal will suffer if and only if some specific axiology is true. However, such prospects don’t seem to
be conceptually or metaphysically impossible. Suppose a demon constructed a button for you, and tells
you that if you push it, then an animal will suffer if some specific axiology is true and nothing will happen
if that axiology is false. On the adequate representation of pushing the button, the probability with which
an animal will suffer should depend on the true axiology. And since this story seems conceptually and
metaphysically possible, it doesn’t seem implausible that m-value relations hold even among such
prospects.
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are such that a given amount of human welfare has twice as much value, according
to T2, than the same amount of animal welfare, according to T3. If we want to
represent your m-value relation as maximising expected moral value (not just some
sort of weighted value), we need to be able to distinguish these cases. We need to
separate probabilities and values. This is perhaps the crucial formal difficulty for the
theory of axiological uncertainty, and one that doesn’t arise equally in standard
frameworks of decision theory.
But we can solve this problem too. We can do so if we introduce a third set of
prospects, Q, which has nothing specifically to do with your evidence, but in which
the probability distribution over axiologies is antecedently given. Intuitively, a
prospect in Q may be, say, that with probability 1/2 respectively either T2 or T3 is
true, and that conditional on either theory there’s a probability of 1/2 respectively
that either an animal or a person will suffer—so that there’s a probability of 1/4 of
each theory-outcome pair ultimately being the case. Formally, these prospects can
be represented as the set of probability distributions on theory-outcome pairs—i.e.,
Q ¼ fa : I  X ! Rþ j
P
i2I;x2X aði; xÞ ¼ 1g. So in addition to m-value facts
concerning prospects in K—about what’s m-best in light of your evidence—I
shall assume that there are m-value facts of the form ‘a is at least as m-good as b’,
concerning prospects in Q. We might think of these as agent-neutral facts about
what would be m-best given that axiologies had certain evidential probabilities—i.e,
facts like ‘if the probability of both T2 and T3 was 1/2, then ...’. I shall represent
these facts by a reflexive binary relation em on Q.
If there are such m-value relations on both K and Q, we can solve our problem
about the separation of probabilities and values. Since the probabilities of axiologies
are already given in the prospects in Q, we can take the specific weighing of the
axiological orderings in the m-value relation on these prospects as a pure reflection
of their value functions. So we can detect the value functions of our axiologies by
considering the m-value facts about Q. And knowing these functions, we can then
detect the specific axiological probabilities that your evidence warrants by
considering your m-value facts about K.3 As an example, suppose again that in
your m-value relation on K, T1 receives no weight, and T2 receives twice as much
weight as T3, in the above-mentioned sense. And suppose now that on the
assumption that the probability of both T2 and T3 was 1/2, human welfare still
receives twice as much weight as animal welfare in the m-value facts about Q—in
the sense that, conditional on this probability distribution, a prospect that leads to
some amount of human welfare if and only if T2 is true is equally as m-good as a
prospect that leads to twice as much animal welfare if and only if T3 is true. This
must then be because these theories compare in a specific way—because a given
amount of human welfare has twice as much value, according to T2, than the same
amount of animal welfare, according to T3. So from your m-value facts about K we
know that both theories really do have probability 1/2 in light of your evidence.
3 At least, this is so if the two kinds of m-value facts are value-consistent, such that the differences
between em on Q and m on K can be fully explained by the different underlying probabilities in Q. I
shall state this more technical assumption in the ‘‘Appendix’’.
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More precisely, given some technical assumptions and the assumption that em on Q
and your m on K both satisfy the von Neumann–Morgenstern axioms, this will
allow us to get an expected utility representation of your m-value facts that’s unique
enough to determine a clean separation of probabilities and values—and thus to say
what facts like (A) and (C) they imply.4
So this is the framework that our theorem will rely upon. To sum up, we shall
need three kinds of facts in order to get an expected moral value interpretation of
your m-value facts: facts about which prospects are better than which according to
our axiologies (represented by relations i on O), facts about which prospects would
be m-better than which given that axiologies had certain evidential probabilities
(represented by the relation em on Q) and facts about which prospects are m-better
than which in light of your evidence (represented by your relation m on K).
4 The theorem and the argument
Given this background, we can now state the actual theorem and argument quite
succinctly. The theorem features three main conditions, applying to our axiologies
and the m-value facts. The first is that all i satisfy the von Neumann–Morgenstern
axioms of Transitivity, Completeness, Independence and Continuity—or that all
axiologies are vNM-conformable, as I shall say. Note that this restricts our
theorem’s scope. Not all axiologies satisfy these axioms, and it needn’t be irrational
to have credence in theories that don’t. If your evidence warrants such credences,
our theorem won’t apply to you. So it’s actually not a fully general theorem of
axiological uncertainty. It’s only a theorem concerning uncertainty about vNM-
conformable axiologies.
The remaining conditions are substantial conditions on the m-value relations. The
second condition is that both em and your m satisfy the von Neumann–
Morgenstern axioms. For simplicity, I’ll express this by saying that your m-value
facts are vNM-conformable—thus henceforth including the agent-neutral facts
among ‘yours’. The third condition is a Pareto condition—to the effect that if two
prospects are equally good on all axiologies with nonzero probability, they’re
equally m-good, and if one of them is at least as good as another on all axiologies
with nonzero probability and strictly better on some, it’s strictly m-better. This
condition is necessary because as far as the von Neumann–Morgenstern axioms are
concerned, your m-value facts may be related to our axiologies in some arbitrary or
4 Note that (as I introduced it) the set Q presupposes that we understand what it means, say, that both T2
and T3 have a probability of 1/2. One may worry that we don’t understand this, specifically in light of my
own reservations concerning facts like (C) in Sect. 1. But I think we can answer this worry. What I’d
doubt is a pretheoretic general understanding of quantitative subjective or evidential probabilities. The
relevant notion in Q can be understood differently. For example, we might imagine that God determined
the true axiology on the basis of a device involving an unpredictable quantum mechanical phenomenon,
and understand the prospects in Q in terms of propensities of that device. We can then assume that Lewis’
(1980) Principal Principle holds, as part of our understanding of evidential probabilities. And given this
assumption, we can take the m-value facts about Q to be a pure reflection of values.
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inappropriate way. For example, if your m-value facts maximise the expected moral
disvalue of your prospects, these facts would still be vNM-conformable. We need to
avoid this, and we can do so by the Pareto condition.5
To state our theorem, say that your m-value facts have a relevantly unique
expected utility representation if there’s a unique probability distribution P on I and
a utility function u on I  X unique up to positive affine transformation,6 such that
for all i in I, all a and b in O, all a and b in K, and all a and b in Q,
a i b iff
X
x2X
aðxÞuði; xÞ
X
x2X
bðxÞuði; xÞ; ð1Þ
a m b iff
X
i2I;x2X
aði; xÞPðiÞuði; xÞ
X
i2I;x2X
bði; xÞPðiÞuði; xÞ; and ð2Þ
a em b iff
X
i2I;x2X
aði; xÞuði; xÞ
X
i2I;x2X
bði; xÞuði; xÞ: ð3Þ
If that’s the case, any probability function Q that can represent your m-value facts in
the sense of (1) to (3) will be equal to P. And any utility function v that can do so
will be such that the functions vði; Þ representing our axiologies are related to the
functions uði; Þ by a joint positive affine transformation. That is, there will be a
single positive scalar s and constant t such that vði; Þ ¼ suði; Þ þ t for all i in I. This
means that all the intra- and intertheoretic ratios of utility-differences—i.e., all the
ratios of the form ðvði; xÞ  vði; yÞÞ=ðvðj; zÞ  vðj; tÞÞ—will be the same for v and u.
Now roughly—i.e., ignoring some more technical assumptions—the following
theorem holds:
Expected Utility Theorem (Intuitively and Roughly): Suppose that all our
axiologies are vNM-conformable. If your m-value facts are vNM-conformable
and satisfy the Pareto condition with respect to our axiologies, they have a
relevantly unique expected utility representation.
This is the core formal theorem of this paper.
As it stands, it’s a purely mathematical result. It says that if your m-value facts
satisfy certain conditions, they can be represented by certain functions. But we can
derive a philosophically significant claim from it by adding the conceptual
assumption I mentioned in Sect. 2. We can assume that if your m-value facts have a
relevantly unique expected utility representation, the probabilities given by P can be
interpreted as the credences that your evidence warrants, and the utility-difference-
ratios given by u as the intra- and intertheoretic comparisons that hold for the
axiologies. That is, we can assume that for facts of the form (A), (B) and (C) to hold
5 The attentive reader may have noted that according to our framework, axiologies and the m-value
relation don’t range over the same prospects. So I haven’t defined what it means that one prospect is at
least as good as another on some axiology and at least as m-good. However, there’s a straightforward
sense in which a prospect a in Q corresponds to a prospect a in O conditional on an axiology Ti. See the
‘‘Appendix’’ for a precise statement of this correspondence and the Pareto condition.
6 A real-valued function v on I  X is a positive affine transformation of another such function u if there
are real numbers s and t with s[ 0 such that vði; xÞ ¼ suði; xÞ þ t for all i in I and x in X.
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just is—or would be—for these probabilities and value-difference-ratios to be the
probabilities and utility-difference-ratios according to the functions that form a
relevantly unique expected utility representation of your m-value facts. This
explication will be meaningful, since the probabilities and utility-difference-ratios
in this representation are unique. I shall call it the decision-theoretic explication of
probabilities and values. In light of this explication, if your m-value facts have a
relevantly unique expected utility representation, we can read each utility function
uði; Þ as a value function Gi of axiology Ti, and P(i) as the credence pi in Ti that
your evidence warrants.7 So together with this assumption, our theorem implies that
if your m-value facts are vNM-conformable and satisfy the Pareto condition, then
for all a and b in K
a m b iff
X
i2I;x2X
aði; xÞpiGiðxÞ
X
i2I;x2X
bði; xÞpiGiðxÞ: ð4Þ
And this biconditional is EMVM.
Now this is still a conditional result. But we can derive EMVM from it by adding
the normative or meta-axiological assumption I mentioned. At least prima facie, all
of the conditions seem plausible. So we can assume that (at least if all our axiologies
are vNM-conformable) your m-value facts are indeed vNM-conformable and satisfy
the Pareto condition with respect to our axiologies. And together with these two
assumptions, our theorem implies that EMVM is true. This is the basic argument of
this paper.
At least prima facie, our theorem thus seems important precisely for the reasons
indicated in the introduction. Firstly, it allows us to explicate what it would be for a
prospect to have a higher expected moral value than another. Or more precisely, it
guarantees that there are conditions under which the decision-theoretic explication
can be used, and facts like (A), (B) and (C) thus made sense of. In particular, it
allows us to say what it would be for certain intertheoretic comparisons to hold. For
axiologies to compare in a certain way would just be for certain m-value facts to be
the case. Anyone trying to even state EMVM without the help of such a theorem
must arguably provide another explication of what it even says. And it’s far from
clear whether there’s a viable alternative. Secondly, the theorem provides a
systematic argument to the effect that EMVM is true. Given our two assumptions,
we don’t just know what it would be for intertheoretic comparisons to hold. We
know that they actually hold. Indeed, much more generally, given our two
assumptions the theorem simply entails EMVM. It thus rules out all alternative
views at once—My Favourite Theory, less formal meta-deontological principles,
forms of risk aversion, or whatever. So at least prima facie, it seems like a very
significant result.
7 Note that I take this to be (neither an analysis nor a stipulative definition but) an explication. For helpful
discussions of the idea of explications in the context of decision theory, see e.g. Broome (1991) or
Meacham and Weisberg (2011). Note also that the precise choice of the functions Gi remains arbitrary up
to a point. If fG1; . . .;Gng is a set of value functions of our axiologies, then for any positive scalar s and
constant t, so is the set fsG1 þ t; . . .; sGn þ tg.
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I’ve pointed out that this argument parallels representation theorem-based
arguments in standard decision theory. It may help to note that the argument has
another famous parallel—viz., to an argument for utilitarianism based on Harsanyi’s
(1955) ‘utilitarian cardinal welfare theorem’. Harsanyi showed, roughly, that if in a
society, each individual’s preferences (or the facts about what’s better for them)
satisfy a set of decision-theoretic axioms, and if ‘social preferences’ (or the facts
about what’s impersonally better) also satisfy these axioms as well as something
like a Pareto condition, then there are utility functions representing these
preferences such that the social utility function is a weighted sum of the individuals’
utility functions. In itself, this is a purely formal result. But suppose utility can be
taken to represent welfare. And suppose the relevant preferences should (or the
relevant facts do) satisfy Harsanyi’s axioms. Then his argument implies that a form
of weighted utilitarianism must be true. And if we also suppose that no one’s
welfare is given more weight than anyone else’s in determining what’s socially best
(as Harsanyi takes to be a conceptual matter; see 1955, 314ff.), his theorem implies
utilitarianism. And we can then read off interpersonal comparisons of welfare from
the social preference relation, just as, I claimed, we can read off intertheoretic
comparisons of value from your m-value facts. My formal framework had to be
more complex than Harsanyi’s. But structurally, these arguments are similar.
Let me refer to the version of EMVM based on the above argument—i.e., the
version understood in terms of the decision-theoretic explication—as decision-
theoretic EMVM. As I shall prove in the ‘‘Appendix’’, our formal theorem is correct.
But the overall argument and decision-theoretic EMVM raise a number of
philosophical questions—as did Harsanyi’s argument, or representation theorem-
based arguments in decision theory. So in the remainder of this paper, let me address
two worries that I take to be especially salient in the context of axiological
uncertainty. The first worry concerns the normative assumption that your m-value
facts do satisfy the above conditions, and particularly Completeness. I shall address
this worry in the next section. The second worry concerns the conceptual
assumption that we can understand intertheoretic comparisons in terms of facts
about m-value, and particularly the question about the normative guidance that the
resulting theory can provide. I shall address this worry in Sect. 6. If I’m right, both
worries indicate ways in which the axiomatic approach could be extended beyond
the particular theorem I’ve given. But neither of them subverts the relevance of the
general approach.
5 The normativity of the conditions
One way to reject the above argument is to deny that your m-value facts indeed are
vNM-conformable and satisfy the Pareto condition. None of these conditions are
trivial, and each of them could be disputed. But the most controversial condition
might be the Completeness axiom—i.e., the constraint that for any two prospects,
one of them must be at least as m-good as the other. This condition implies that no
two prospects are incomparable in m-value. It is doing the main work in
guaranteeing intertheoretic comparisons. So you might want to deny it.
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It’s worth considering a radical way to deny it. Take a nontrivial m-value fact—
i.e., a fact that’s not entailed by the Pareto consideration, to the effect that one
prospect is at least as m-good as another although the latter is better than the former
on some axiology Ti with nonzero probability. You might agree that if such
nontrivial m-value facts held, this would mean that axiologies compared in a certain
way—viz., that the relevant value difference between the prospects, according to Ti,
wouldn’t be great enough to outweigh this value difference according to the other
axiologies. But you might believe for independent reasons that there can’t be any
truths about how theories compare. And you might infer from this that there can’t be
any such m-value facts—that the relevant prospects must be m-incomparable, or
that neither of them is at least as m-good as the other. In other words, instead of
accepting my conclusion, you might use modus tollens and hold that there are no
nontrivial m-value facts, or that your m-value relation is radically incomplete.
This is a consistent position. But it just seems implausible. We may not know
how precisely to compare our axiologies, or what precise m-value facts hold. (More
on this in the next section.) But at least it seems implausible that your m-value
relation should be as radically incomplete—that whenever you have the slightest
uncertainty between axiologies that disagree on the betterness ranking of any two
prospects, you must not judge one such prospect better than another in light of your
uncertainty. And this seems true not just for uncertainty about relatively similar
views like speciesist and non-speciesist total utilitarian axiologies. It seems true
quite generally. Or at least, for one thing, I take this to be a very strong intuition.
Moreover, accepting radical incompleteness would arguably involve a considerable
theoretical cost. Some people have doubted the importance of m-value (see
Weatherson 2014; Harman 2015; Hedden 2016), and I cannot defend it here. But
most people, I take it, think it’s vital that there’s a notion of value that’s sensitive to
our inconclusive axiological evidence—both to guide us in our decision-making and
to set a fair standard for blame and praise. Insofar as that’s right, it’s a heavy cost to
assume that your m-value relation is so radically incomplete. Consequently,
Completeness is in fact something that even many sceptics want to endorse. These
people want to deny that intertheoretic comparisons are possible, but nonetheless
endorse a theory of m-value that satisfies Completeness—such as My Favourite
Theory (see e.g. Gracely 1996; Gustafsson and Torpman 2014; also Tarsney 2018,
338ff.). But the above theorem shows that they’re then stuck with a form of EMVM,
or else have to deny one of the other conditions.8
If all of this is right, and if the other conditions are plausible, the top-down
approach of decision-theoretic EMVM suggests a sort of deflationary argument
against scepticism. We may not know how precisely to compare our axiologies. But
8 For instance, if the Pareto condition is added to My Favourite Theory, the resulting view violates
Continuity. To see this, suppose there are two axiologies, T1 and T2, and that they have a probability of 2/3
and 1/3 respectively (in options a, b, and c in Q). Suppose that according to T1, a is equally as good as b,
and b is better than c, and that according to T2, a is better than b, and b is equally as good as c (cf. fn. 5).
Then in light of the Pareto condition, a em b, and b em c. However, since according to the ‘favourite’
theory T1, any mixture between a and c is worse than b (or so we may assume), there’s no p 20; 1½ such
that paþ ð1  pÞc em b.
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since your m-value relation isn’t radically incomplete, some intertheoretic
comparisons must hold.
However, even if radical incompleteness is implausible, you might worry that
absolute completeness is implausible too. Completeness requires that for any two
prospects, and for whatever uncertainty you have, either one prospect is m-better
than the other or they’re precisely equally m-good. This implies that all axiologies
are fully commensurable. For instance, take the value difference between harming
and not harming an animal in a certain way, according to a non-speciesist axiology.
Completeness implies that there’s a precise amount of harm to a person—a precise
amount of pinpricks, say—such that that value difference is equally as great as the
value difference between inflicting and not inflicting this harm on the person,
according to a speciesist axiology. And even if you’re not a radical sceptic, you
might think that this is too much. (And you might believe this even if all our
axiologies themselves satisfy Completeness).
This, I think, is a problem for the above theorem. Completeness does indeed
seem too strong. However, the general axiomatic approach that this theorem
exemplifies doesn’t presuppose Completeness. There are representation theorems
that don’t feature such a constraint. On such theorems, the relevant binary relations
get represented not by single utility functions, but by sets of such functions. So if
there’s some incompleteness in your m-value facts because our axiologies aren’t
fully commensurable, it may be possible to represent axiologies with sets of value
functions and retain a non-trivial version of EMVM.9 This would render our
theorem formally more complex. But it wouldn’t alter the general structure of the
argument. So this, I think, is a reason to extend the axiomatic approach beyond the
particular theorem I’ve presented. But it’s not a reason to reject the entire approach,
or the kind of argument I’ve given.
6 The decision-theoretic explications
The above argument invites another worry. Suppose you grant that your m-value
facts satisfy the conditions of our theorem. There are still infinitely many different
ways in which they could do so. And as long as you don’t know how precisely they
satisfy them, decision-theoretic EMVM is of little use in practice. Standardly, the
theory of axiological uncertainty is supposed to take the probabilities of axiologies
as inputs and tell you which of your prospects is m-best. But decision-theoretic
EMVM starts with facts about m-betterness, and determines probabilities and
comparisons from them. This doesn’t mean that our theory cannot be action-guiding
at all. If you know some of your m-value facts to start from, the axioms may imply
certain other such facts that follow—e.g. by transitivity. But you might worry that
you don’t know any such facts without prior theoretic guidance—in particular,
without prior knowledge of how to make intertheoretic comparisons. Indeed, you
9 See e.g. Nau’s (2006) ‘Theorem 2’ for a representation theorem for state-dependent utilities that doesn’t
presuppose Completeness.
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might worry, that’s why we need a theory of axiological uncertainty in the first
place. This was argued by Brian Hedden, who reports to have ‘few if any brute
intuitions’ (2016, 114) concerning which prospects are m-better than which, and
suspects that this is true for most people.
This worry is analogous to one about Harsanyi’s theorem. Standardly, the theory
of ‘social preferences’ is supposed to take individual preferences as inputs and tell
you which of your prospects is socially best. But Harsanyi’s theorem starts with
social and individual preferences, and then tells you that if they satisfy certain
axioms, you can pick utility functions that represent them and relate in a certain
way. Again, Harsanyi’s axioms might well help you derive some social preferences
if you know some such preferences to start from. But you might worry that you
don’t have brute intuitions about what’s socially best and thus can’t know any such
preferences—in particular, not unless you’re antecedently told how to make
interpersonal comparisons of welfare (see Hedden 2016, 114).
This is an important worry. But (setting ‘social preferences’ aside) I’m much less
pessimistic than Hedden is about our ability to arrive at the m-value facts.
Axiological uncertainty undeniably raises difficult philosophical questions and
presents an intricate problem for decision theory. But in an important sense, it’s also
a fairly straightforward phenomenon. It can be explained to non-specialists in a
couple of sentences. And it doesn’t seem to engender anything like intellectual
paralysis as far as m-value judgments are concerned. For instance, I suspect most
people would admit that they cannot be certain about the moral value of equality or
deserved punishment or the creation of an extra person. But I also suspect that, when
pressed to judge in light of this uncertainty, most people would consider it m-better
to bring about an equal distribution of some amount of welfare rather than a grossly
unequal distribution of a marginally greater amount of it; or m-better to punish the
guilty rather than an innocent person for a serious moral wrong, even if this involves
greater costs for society; but perhaps m-worse to create a person and thereby greatly
harm an existing one rather than to leave the population as it is. Or perhaps they’d
judge differently. But I’d be surprised if people were entirely clueless about which
of such prospects are m-better. If anything, a sense of cluelessness seems to be post-
theoretic, issuing perhaps from one’s view about the problem of intertheoretic
comparisons or one’s metaethical assumptions.
Now, even if we do have brute m-value intuitions—and perhaps not just ‘few if
any’—you might still worry that we don’t have enough of them. After all, there still
seem to be myriads of cases where we lack firm judgments and cannot even derive
them from structurally simple cases about which we’re intuitively clear. So you
might still think that our intuitions and the axioms are at best a thoroughly
inconclusive guide to the facts.10 But I am not so sure. It’s certainly true that there
are very many cases where we lack any firm intuition. But this needn’t indicate an
epistemic defect. Recall what I said in the last section. Perhaps the Completeness
axiom is wrong. Perhaps, or indeed plausibly, there often aren’t any positive facts
about which prospect’s m-better than which—since our axiologies aren’t fully
10 I thank an anonymous reviewer for pressing me on this worry.
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commensurable. And if this is so, then our lack of firm intuitions needn’t indicate
that there are facts we’re not grasping, and that our intuitions are poor. It may
indicate that there aren’t any facts, and that our intuitions are a good guide to that.
In other words, at least when we consider cases that are structurally simple, we can
interpret the absence of a firm intuition as the intuition of the absence of a fact.
Indeed, personally, I’d trust intuitions of this kind more than many a theory—even,
or rather especially, if that theory entailed a simple principle for making precise
comparisons.
As an analogy, consider intratheoretic value comparisons. And take a pluralist
theory on which both pleasure and beauty are valuable. Clearly, we often lack firm
intuitions about how precisely these values compare—about which precise increase
in virtue is worth what precise sacrifice in pleasure. Often, we feel, we cannot make
a confident positive judgment. But plausibly, this just indicates that these values
aren’t fully commensurable and that there often aren’t any pertinent betterness facts
(or that there wouldn’t be any such facts, if pluralism was true). Our incomplete
body of intuitions may well be a fairly adequate mirror of the fragmented landscape
of facts. And the same, I’d suggest, goes for m-value. So our intuitions might really
get us quite far.
But you might still remain dissatisfied. You might also want to have an
explanation for why your m-value facts hold—and perhaps independently of
concerns about action-guidance. You might just find it implausible that these facts
should be metaphysically brute (see Tarsney 2018, 327 for a related worry). So let
me also give a more constructive reply. Decision-theoretic EMVM implies that
m-value facts aren’t grounded in quantitative facts about probabilities and
intertheoretic comparisons. According to our explication, the latter aren’t prior to
the former. But the theory doesn’t presuppose that m-value facts must be brute, or
not grounded in anything else.
As an example, they might be grounded in a constructivist manner in epistemic
norms. Consider an axiology on which only pleasure has value, and an axiology on
which pleasure and virtue have value. Ceteris paribus, it seems implausible that
your m-value facts should be such that the value of pleasure is 3.64 times greater on
the former than on the latter axiology. More plausibly, they’re such that the value of
pleasure is the same on both theories. But this needn’t be a brute fact. Arguably, a
credence distribution on which the value of pleasure is the same on both theories is
simpler than a credence distribution on which the value is 3.64 times greater on one
of them. So this m-value fact could be grounded in an epistemic norm of simplicity,
to the effect that you should ceteris paribus favour simpler credence distributions
over more complex ones. In other words, perhaps it’s not that the simplicity-
principle is justified in virtue of guiding us towards an independent realm of
m-value facts. Perhaps this principle is first, and helps ground the facts about what’s
better in light of our evidence. And perhaps there are more complex epistemic
norms—e.g., norms of conservatism or coherence—which can ground m-value facts
in more complex cases. This would amount to a sort of constructivism, where
m-value facts are the outcome of ideal deliberation in light of epistemic principles.
This is just an example. The key point is that decision-theoretic EMVM doesn’t
presuppose that your m-value facts are brute. And if they are grounded in further
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facts, then these facts can also guide you in practice, or help you arrive at your
m-value relation. So this indicates another way in which the axiomatic approach
could be extended beyond the specific argument I’ve given. We might furnish it
with an account of what grounds m-value. Personally, I’m unsure whether we
should. Perhaps your m-value facts are just brute. But the possibility is at least worth
noting.
7 Conclusion
Let me conclude. I’ve shown (or will show formally in the ‘‘Appendix’’) that given
the decision-theoretic explication of probabilities and values, if your m-value facts
are vNM-conformable and satisfy the Pareto condition with respect to our
axiologies, EMVM is true. I’ve also begun to argue that our explication is a viable
explication—at least as far as action-guidingness is concerned—and that your
m-value facts do indeed satisfy these conditions—or at least, that your m-value
relation isn’t radically incomplete. If what I’ve said is right, then the axiomatic
approach emerges as a very promising way to ground EMVM—to explain what it
says, and to argue for its truth.
Many questions remain open. As I’ve indicated in the last two sections, there’s a
formal question about how to weaken the Completeness axiom, and a metaphysical
question about possible grounds of your m-value facts. There are also further
normative questions about whether the Pareto conditions and the other decision-
theoretic axioms are plausible in the context of m-value. There are further questions
about how the argument could be extended—for instance, beyond axiological
uncertainty to moral uncertainty generally. And if we accept the approach, then
there’s a range of practical questions about which m-value facts hold. My aim in this
paper hasn’t been to settle these questions. I’m happy if I’ve set the stage for an
axiomatic treatment of our problem, and shown that it’s a promising approach worth
exploring further.
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Appendix
Let me state and prove the precise theorem. The overall argument ultimately
depends not on the mathematical result in terms of abstract functions, but on the
philosophical theorem in which these functions are given an extra-mathematical
significance. So I shall also give a more precise formulation of the decision-
theoretic explication, and then state and prove the theorem in its interpreted form.
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As stated above, I assume that we have a nonempty finite set of outcomes
X ¼ fx; y; . . .zg, a nonempty finite set of axiologies T ¼ fT1;T2; . . .Tng with the
index-set I ¼ f1; 2; . . .ng, and three sets of prospects, O ¼ fa : X ! RþjP
x2X aðxÞ ¼ 1g, K ¼ fa : I  X ! Rþ j
P
x2X aði; xÞ ¼ 1 8i 2 Ig, and Q ¼ fa :
I  X ! Rþ j
P
i2I;x2X aði; xÞ ¼ 1g. For every i in I, i is a reflexive binary relation
on O (representing Ti). m is a reflexive binary relation on K and em a reflexive
binary relation on Q. In each case, two further relations are implied as usual: a i b
if a i b but not b i a, and a	 ib if a i b and b i a; similarly for the relations on
K and Q. For any a and b in O, and any p 2 ½0; 1, let paþ ð1  pÞb in O be such
that ðpaþ ð1  pÞbÞðxÞ ¼ paðxÞ þ ð1  pÞbðxÞ for all x in X; similarly for the
respective elements in K and Q. Now for a reflexive binary relation  on O, define
the following conditions:
Transitivity O: for all a, b and c in O, if a  b and b  c, then a  c;
Completeness O: for all a and b in O, a  b or b  a;
Independence O: for all a, b and c in O and p 20; 1½, if a  b, then
paþ ð1  pÞc  pbþ ð1  pÞc;
Continuity O: for all a, b and c in O, if a  b and b  c, then there exist
p; q 20; 1½, such that paþ ð1  pÞc  b and b  qaþ ð1  qÞc.
Say that a binary relation  on O is vNM-conformable if it satisfies these four
conditions. The same conditions can be formulated for a binary relation  on K,
and for a binary relation e on Q. Say that such relations are vNM-conformable if
they satisfy the corresponding four conditions. For some binary relations i on O
and  on K say that i is non-uniform if there are a and b in O such that a i b,
and that  is non-uniform if there are a and b in K such that a  b.
We need to assure that m and em are value-consistent—in the sense that the
differences between them are fully explained by the underlying probabilities in Q
and not by different values concerning prospects in Q and K. To that end, let
Qþ 
 Q be the set of prospects in Q on which all axiologies have a positive
probability, i.e. Qþ ¼ fa 2 Q j Px2X aði; xÞ[ 0 8i 2 Ig. Define a function
L : Qþ !K; a 7!LðaÞ, such that for all i in I and x in X,
LðaÞði; xÞ ¼ aði; xÞ=
X
y2X
aði; yÞ: ð5Þ
Intuitively, L turns a prospect in Qþ into the corresponding prospect in K in which
the underlying probabilities have been scraped out. For some i in I and a and b in
K, say that a and b agree outside i if for all j in I; j 6¼ i, and all x in X,
aðj; xÞ ¼ bðj; xÞ; and similarly for some a and b in Q. For some i in I and binary
relations  on K and e on Q, say that i is null if (i) for all a and b in K that agree
outside i, a 	 b, and (ii) there exist a and b in Q that agree outside i such that
a e b. Now for some binary relations  on K and e on Q, we can define the
Consistency Axiom: For all i in I and all a and b in Qþ, if a and b agree
outside i and LðaÞ  LðbÞ, then a e b. Moreover, if i is not null, then for all a
and b in Qþ that agree outside i, if a e b, then LðaÞ LðbÞ.
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To state the above-mentioned Pareto condition formally, let Qi 
 Q be the set of
prospects in which Ti has a strictly positive probability, i.e.
Qi ¼ fa 2 Q j Px2X aði; xÞ[ 0g. Define for each i in I a function Hi : Qi ! O;
a7!HiðaÞ, such that for all x in X,
HiðaÞðxÞ ¼ aði; xÞ=
X
y2X
aði; yÞ: ð6Þ
Intuitively, Hi turns a prospect a into the prospect that a represents, given Ti (if
there is such a prospect). Say that P is a probability distribution on I if P is a
function P : I ! Rþ with
P
i2I PðiÞ ¼ 1: For any probability distribution P on I, let
QP 
 Q be the set of prospects in which P is the underlying probability distribution
over axiologies, i.e. QP ¼ fa 2 Q j Px2X aði; xÞ ¼ PðiÞ 8 i 2 Ig. Now for some
binary relation e on Q and binary relations i on O, define the
Pareto Condition: For any probability distribution P on I, and for all a and b
in QP, if HiðaÞ	 iHiðbÞ for all i in I with PðiÞ[ 0, then a e	 b; and if
HiðaÞ i HiðbÞ for all i in I with PðiÞ[ 0 and HjðaÞ j HjðbÞ for some j in I
with PðjÞ[ 0, then a e b.
Let me now state the decision-theoretic explications more formally. So for binary
relations  on K and e on Q, a probability distribution P on I and a function
u : I  X ! R, say that the expectation of P and u represents  and e ordinally if
for all a and b in K and all a and b in Q,
a m b iff
X
i2I;x2X
aði; xÞPðiÞuði; xÞ
X
i2I;x2X
bði; xÞPðiÞuði; xÞ; and ð7Þ
a em b iff
X
i2I;x2X
aði; xÞuði; xÞ
X
i2I;x2X
bði; xÞuði; xÞ: ð8Þ
For a binary relation i on O and a function u : X ! R, say that the expectation of u
represents i ordinally if for all a and b in O,
a i b iff
X
x2X
aðxÞuðxÞ
X
x2X
bðxÞuðxÞ: ð9Þ
Furthermore, say that a function u : X ! R represents i cardinally if for all x, y, z
and t in X, statement (B) (from Sect. 1) is true if and only if
ðuðxÞ  uðyÞÞ=ðuðzÞ  uðtÞÞ ¼ n. The decision-theoretic explication of intratheo-
retic comparisons is that if there is a function u : X ! R, unique up to positive
affine transformation, whose expectation represents i ordinally, then u represents
i cardinally. Or in other words, for such a utility function to represent i cardi-
nally just is for it to be such that it represents i ordinally and is unique up to
positive affine transformation in doing so. Similarly, for a probability distribution P
on I and a function u : I  X ! R, say that P and u represent intertheoretic com-
parisons cardinally and axiological probabilities quantitatively if for all i and j in I
and all x, y, z and t in X, the respective statements (A) and (C) are true if and only if
pi ¼ PðiÞ, pj ¼ PðjÞ and ðuði; xÞ  uði; yÞÞ=ðuðj; zÞ  uðj; tÞÞ ¼ n. The decision-
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theoretic explication of intertheoretic comparisons and axiological probabilities is
that if there is such a pair of P and u, with P being unique and u unique up to
positive affine transformation, whose expectation represents m and em ordinally,
and if for all i in I, uði; Þ represents i cardinally, then P and u represent
intertheoretic comparisons cardinally and axiological probabilities quantitatively.
Given these explications, the following theorem—the main philosophical
theorem of this paper in its precise technical form—holds:
Expected Moral Value Theorem: Suppose that all i are vNM-conformable
and non-uniform. If m and em are vNM-conformable and jointly satisfy the
Consistency Axiom, if m is non-uniform and em satisfies the Pareto
Condition with respect to i, then for all a and b in K,
a m b iff
X
i2I;x2X
aði; xÞpiGiðxÞ
X
i2I;x2X
bði; xÞpiGiðxÞ: ð10Þ
Note that there’s thus another restriction to the scope of the theorem. It’s not a fully
general theorem of axiological uncertainty. It’s only a theorem concerning uncer-
tainty about vNM-conformable and non-uniform axiologies.
Let me now prove that this theorem is true. Karni and Schmeidler (1980; see also
2016) prove
Karni and Schmeidler’s Theorem: Let  be a reflexive binary relation onK
and e a reflexive binary relation on Q. Suppose that they’re both vNM-
conformable and jointly satisfy the Consistency Axiom, and that  is non-
uniform. Then (i) there exists a function u : I  X ! R and a probability
distribution P on I such that, for all a and b in K,
a  b iff
X
i2I;x2X
aði; xÞPðiÞuði; xÞ
X
i2I;x2X
bði; xÞPðiÞuði; xÞ; ð11Þ
and for all a and b in Q,
a e b iff
X
i2I;x2X
aði; xÞuði; xÞ
X
i2I;x2X
bði; xÞuði; xÞ: ð12Þ
(ii) u in (i) is unique up to positive affine transformation. (iii) If i is null,
PðiÞ ¼ 0, and if i is not null and there are a and b in K that agree outside i
such that a  b, PðiÞ[ 0. Moreover, if for all i in I there are a and b in Q that
agree outside i such that a eb, then P in (i) is unique.
This theorem immediately implies that if m and em are vNM-conformable and
jointly satisfy the Consistency Axiom and m is non-uniform, then there exists a
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function u : I  X ! R and a probability distribution P on I such that, for all a and b
in K,
a m b iff
X
i2I;x2X
aði; xÞPðiÞuði; xÞ
X
i2I;x2X
bði; xÞPðiÞuði; xÞ; ð13Þ
and for all a and b in Q,
a em b iff
X
i2I;x2X
aði; xÞuði; xÞ
X
i2I;x2X
bði; xÞuði; xÞ; ð14Þ
with u being unique up to positive affine transformation. Clearly, this is consistent
with the assumptions that all i are vNM-conformable and non-uniform and that
em satisfies the Pareto Condition with respect to the relations i. What remains to
be proved is the uniqueness of P, given these assumptions. So for some i in I,
consider the set Qip¼1 
 Q of prospects in which the probability of Ti is 1, i.e.
Qip¼1 ¼ fa 2 Q j
P
x2X aði; xÞ ¼ 1g. This set is obviously isomorphic to O. All a
and b in Qip¼1 agree outside i. Moreover, given that all i are non-uniform, there are
a and b in Qip¼1 such that HiðaÞ i HiðbÞ and thus—since em satisfies the Pareto
Condition—a e b. So it follows from condition (iii) of Karni and Schmeidler’s
Theorem that P is unique.
This means that we can apply the decision-theoretic explications. Consider first
the explication of intratheoretic comparisons. Note that for all i in I, the function
uði; Þ on X is such that for all a and b in Qip¼1,
a em b iff
X
x2X
uði; xÞaði; xÞ
X
x2X
uði; xÞbði; xÞ: ð15Þ
The Pareto Condition immediately implies that for all a and b in Qip¼1,
a em b iff HiðaÞ i HiðbÞ: ð16Þ
And since for all x in X and all a in Qip¼1, HiðaÞðxÞ ¼ aði; xÞ, uði; Þ is a function on X
whose expectation represents i ordinally in the sense of (9). Given the relevant
uniqueness of u, the decision-theoretic explication of intratheoretic comparisons
implies that uði; Þ represents i cardinally. So we can apply the explication of
intertheoretic comparisons and axiological probabilities. Given (13) and (14), the
expectation of P and u represents m and em ordinally. And given the relevant
uniqueness of P and u, our explication thus implies that P and u represent interthe-
oretic comparisons cardinally and axiological probabilities quantitatively. We can
thus interpret P(i) in (13) as representing the evidential probability pi of the theory
that’s represented by the value function Gi ¼ uði; Þ. The Expected Moral Value
Theorem follows. h
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